The moral categorization of homosexuality in the West has undergone a transformation in recent years. While many parts of the globe still criminalize homosexuality—in some cases punishable by death—the West has accepted (in a legal sense) homosexuality as an immutable quality alongside race and ethnicity. Much of the recent change is positive, as marginalizing and humiliating a section of the population for the victimless choice of homosexuality is archaic and inhumane. The movement—driven largely by the left—to allow dignity to people not adopting heteronormative behaviour is an overdue correction.

Still, as a question of logic, whether or not homosexuality is categorically similar to race is worth exploring, in part because of the associated claim that discrimination on the basis of sexuality is similar to discrimination on the basis of race. The question has real world consequences. No one except those on the fringe of the far right argue that it is morally sound to discriminate on the basis of race (though some libertarians might argue that businesses be allowed to do so without government intervention). Many on the mainstream right do, however, argue that it is morally defensible to discriminate on the basis of sexuality. The latter dispute seems to present most visibly in conflicts between bakers and sexual-minority couples.

When assessing this question of similarity, a criticism of first instinct is that homosexuality is an action rather than a state of being. This is, however, too crude a formulation and elicits the immediate response that homosexuality is more than just something one does. It may well be true that there is a gay gene, so to speak: an observable biological feature that makes one gay in a very natural sense. It is possible, then, that homosexuality is analogous to race in that they are both states of being, but homosexuality is nevertheless a state of being that manifests in action (or desired action) in a way that is not analogous to race. Being black does not cause black people to do specific things, nor does being White or Asian.

Consider, however, if race did manifest in specific actions; would it then be fair to make judgments of those actions? Perhaps the topic of race is too sensitive to prompt an honest response, so let us evaluate the question in the abstract: if a biological feature manifests in a real world action, is it fair to make judgments about the moral character of that action, or is the fact that it is the result of biology sufficient to know the action is moral?

Let us consider pedophilia to clarify the question. Suppose it is discovered that pedophilia has a genetic root; could it be said that the manifested action is therefore moral? Clearly, the answer would be a resounding no. This is not to suggest that homosexuality is morally similar to pedophilia, as no reasonable person would make this argument. However, from the immediate indignant response most have to this comparison we can draw an important point. To explain why homosexuality and pedophilia are different, one must necessarily analyze the morality of the actions themselves. Knowing that both are (hypothetically) caused by genetics tells us nothing about the ethics of the resulting actions.

We can now extract an important principle: a biological reality (state of being) that does not manifest in a specific action is meaningfully different from a state of being that does. While the former deserves legal protection (or in the least protection offered by fiercely-held social norms), it is clear that we must reserve the right to make judgments about the latter. In other words, the position that one should not judge any trait that is innate or unchangeable is only tenable when that trait does not manifest in action.

Let us consider this next predictable rebuttal: there are principles that are logically unsound but practically useful. This is almost certainly true, and in the context of this piece one could agree that homosexuality and race are not analogous immutable qualities but believe there is value in acting as though they are. In other words, the discrimination homosexuals have faced in the past makes appropriate the categorization with race in human rights legislation. This seems reasonable, but it is important to realize that whatever benefit this provides, there are costs too.

To illuminate these costs, consider two further questions. The first: should Christian churches or Muslim mosques be required to conduct gay marriage ceremonies against the tenets of their beliefs? The second: should the same religious institutions have to conduct interracial marriage ceremonies? Most people would acknowledge these are different moral issues, the latter to which everyone would say of course and the former to which many would say that is a tough question. The current legal and ideological framework in most Western countries, however, does not reflect this nuance.

Treating sexual minorities with dignity is a worthwhile pursuit, but by insisting that sexuality is the same sort of immutable quality as race we are placing in the moral realm of racial discrimination things that are legitimate issues of conscience. How to reflect this nuance in law is—to be fair—much less clear, and there is understandable concern about going too far in reverse to make corrections.

Perhaps a good first step is to simply acknowledge that this issue merits serious consideration. Consideration, notably, it is not currently receiving.